Results of a 6-year follovv-up of previous research evaluating the effects of Llichigan's December 1978 increase in the legal drinking age from IS to 21 are reported.
Earlier research demonstrated the immediate effect of Xlichigan's raised legal age in reducing motor vehicle crash involvement among young drivers. The current study examined 6 years of post-law traffic crash data, using Box-Jenkins intervention analysis methods to assess the long-term effects of the raised drinking age. Results revealed long-term effects of the law similar to the initial effects identified earlier. Over the 6-year follo\v-up period, the rate of involvement in injury-producing single-vehicle nighttime crashes among drivers age IS-Z0 was 16% lower than the level expected. had the drinking age law not changed. Police-reported drinking driver crash involvement \vas down 19%. In contrast to many alcohol-imPaired driving countermeasures, the raised legal drinking age appears to have a long-term effect in reducing motor vehicle crash involvement among young drivers. The current follolv-up study fvas designed to determine
Lvhether the short-term effects of Xlichigan's raised legal drinking age were maintained 6 years later.
METHOD
Data lvere collected on all injury-producing traffic crashes that occurred in the State of Michigan from January 1976 through December 1984. Frequency of injury crash involvement was stratified by age, to permit comparisons of Is-20 year olds (the group directly affected by the higher drinking age) lvith motorists age 21 and over. Such comparisons ensured that broader changes in crash involvement in the early 198Os-due to nonage-specific alcohol-impaired driving programs and a major economic recession. for examplewere controlled when estimating the effects of the legal drinking age.
The legal age change is expected to reduce the incidence of alcohol impairment in drivers under 21. Txvo indicators of alco-'Exact estimates of the drinking age effect vary depending on t'he indicator of alcohol-related crashes and analytic model used.
hol-related crash involvement xvere therefore examined.
The first was based on the responses of investigating police officers to an item on the standardized report form asking whether or not the driver "had been drinking" (HBD). This item is independent of anv judgment by the officer that alcohol contributed to or caused the crash. Xloreover, it is not dependent on an arrest for driving under the influence or on the results of a chemical test. ' The item therefore has a high degree of face validity as a measure of the presence of alcohol in a crash. However, the HBD indicator relies on police judgments and therefore is potentially unreliable. For example, increased public attention to alcohol-impaired driving in recent years, policy changes such as the raised drinking age, and other events may affect the propensity of policy officers to record the presence of alcohol.
TO control for the potential unreliability of the HBD measure, an indirect indicator of alcohol-related crashes vvas also examined:
single Figures  3 and 1) . Such overall crash reductions probably resulted from reduced trav.el and the other effects of a major economic recession (Wagenaar, 1984) , as well as from renewed efforts to promote highway safety and reduce injuries, such as April 1983 legislation increasing penalties for alcohol-impaired driving (hlichigan Public Acts 309.310, and 311 of 19s"). In contrast to the overall reductions in the early and mid-19SOs, reductions in HBD and SVN crashes beginning in January 1979 were limited to 18-20 year olds-the focus of the change in legal drinking age. To control for changes over time in the number of young drivers, the amount of motor vehicle travel, and other factors influencing the total number of crashes. the percent of all IS-20-year-old HBD drivers involved in injuy-producing crashes was analyzed, instead of simply the number of HBD drivers. Because of reporting of drinking drivers by police officers investigating crashes improved considerably during the early 197Os, only data after January 1976 were included in the timeseries models. The iterative specification, estimation, and diagnosis intemention analysis (1 -B") LnY, = (1 .c!%SB'~) (1 + .33B)a, - indicating that drinking drivers 21 and over experienced a significant 13.4% increase in their rate of involvement in injury producing crashes in the early 1980s. Thus, the raised drinking age apparently prevented 18-20-year-olds from experiencing the same 13.4 'Jo increase in the rate of HBD crash involvement that occurred among those 21 and over. The difference between the intervention parameter estimates for the 18-20 and 21-and-over age groups is clear11 significant (2 = 4.64) and represents a 19% (6% plus 13%) reduction in the rate of drinking-driver crash involvement attributable to the increase in legal alcohol purchase age.
Time series analyses produced the follo\v- indicating no significant change after the drinking age was raised from 18 to 21. The lack of a significant change in SVN crash involvement among 18-20-year-olds contrasts with the significant 6.1% decline in HBD crashes noted above. Concluding that the legal age had no effect on youth SVN crash involvement would be premature, however, because drivers age 21 and over experienced a significant 16.6% increase in the rate of SVN crashes at the time 18-20-year-olds showed no change.
Thus, it appears that the raised legal age prevented the Results for the SVN analyses are similar to those for the HBD analyses when the differences between the lS-20 and 21-and-over groups are taken into account. The difference between the bvo groups is significant (Z = 2.40) and represents a net 16 % reduction in the rate of lS-20-year-old SVN crash involvement from the levels expected, had the legal age not been changed.
The difference between the two age groups is smaller for SVX crashes than for HBD crashes (16 Co versus 19 % ) , in-
that a small part of the observed HBD effect may be due to a decrease in reporting after the drinking age \vas raised.
DISCUSSION
The long-term effect of Xlichigan's increase in legal drinking age should be compared with the short-term effect identified in previous research. Earlier time-series analyses revealed a 28 % reduction in HBD drivers involved in injury-producing crashes and an 11% reduction in SW injury-producing crashes during the first 12 months after Michigan raised its drinking age (\Vagenaar, 1983) . Because both measures of crash involvement have their limitations, the midpoint of these tvvo estimates, 19.5 % , is a reasonable overall estimate of the short-term reduction in alcohol-related crash involvement attributable to the increase in the legal age. In the current study, time-series analyses of baseline and 6 years of post-lawchange data revealed reductions of 19% in Actual the rate of HBD drivers involved in injuryproducing crashes and 16% in the rate of SVN injury-producing crashes, both attributable to the drinking age increase. The similarity of findings from analyses of two admittedly imperfect measures of alcohol-impaired driving increases confidence in the validity of each.
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Ninety-five percent confidence intervals for the estimated long-term effect of the drinking age in reducing youth crash involvement are 12 to 26% for the HBD measure and 9 to 29 % for the SVN measure. Based on these results, two conclusions can be made. First, the long-term effects of Michigan's increase in legal drinking age are not significantly different from the short-term effects identified in earlier research. Second, the results for the State of Michigan are consistent with the experiences in numerous other states. Evidence to date clearly indicates the existence of an effect of raised legal drinking ages on youth crash involvement.
The exact magnitude (i.e., point estimate) of that effect varies from study to study, but most frequently is in the 10 to 20% range. A few recent studies appear to indicate that a raised legal age has little effect on motor vehicle crash involvement (Hingson et al., 19S.3; Smith et al., 1984; Bolotin & DeSario, 19S5a, 1985b) . The apparent inconsistency between these studies and the results of most of the drinking age literature may be due to the different levels of statistical power of the research designs and analytic methods used. In some cases, a conclusion of "no significant effect" of the drinking age is a result of a study design with inadequate statistical power to detect an effect within the range expected. Given the results presented here and the findings of other recent studies (Arnold, 1985 : DuMouchel et al., 1985 , the best estimate of the long-term effects of a higher legal drinking age is a decline in SVN crash involvement of about 15 % . If the research design used to measure the effects of a legal age change requires a Fall 1SSWVolurne 1 T/;l'rrmber 3 decline in youth crash in\.ol\.ement larger than 1.5 R to achieve statistic4 significance, it is unlikely that a significant effect of the drinking age xvi11 be found.3 A conclusion of "no statisticall>. significant effect" is interpreted by many policy-makers as "no effect," when it really means that no effect of a specific magnitude was found. Therefore, researchers should state clearly the smallest effect that could be measured bv their study. In the study of ,Lfichigan's loniterm experience reported here, a drinking age effect smaller than a 7 ';D decline in crash involvement could not be detected.l Continuing research is needed to fullv understand the nature of the effects of higher drinking ages. Nevertheless, available evidence clearly indicates that a higher drinking age redu~es.injuries and damage. If the goal is to reduce alcohol-related traffic casualties, a legal age of 21 is recommended.
Despite the safety benefits of a higher drinking age, some argue in favor of a lower drinking age based on equity, difficulty in enforcement, and other considerations not related to health and safety. Numerous such arguments can reasonably be made. For esample, interviews with a sample of Massachusetts police officers found little support for the higher age among some officers, high variability in enforcement levels, and minimal enforcement in some areas (Hingson et al., 1983) . Given such low enforcement levels, some argue that the higher drinking age may foster disrespect for the law among youth, and that the lack of resolve to enforce this law indicates that other strategies may be more effective in reducing crashes among drivers of all ages. Despite the paucity of policies and programs that have a demonstrated long-term effect in reducing alcohol-related traffic crashes, many individuals favor using 3For example, the stndy design used by Hingson et al. (198. 3) required a drinking age effect of at least a 2.5% decline in SVN crash involvement to reach statistical significance at the 0.03 le\.-el. Any effect smaller than that could not be detected.
'The 7% minimum detectable effect of the research design used here is based on comparisons betlreen the l&z0 and "l-and-over age gro&. Analyses of the IS-20 group alone could detect crash reductions as small as 5%. approaches other than the minimum age to reduce alcohoI-impaired driving. Although all of these issues deserve attention in the policy debates srlrrounding the drinking age, they should not obscure the research evidence that an increase in drinking age from 1S to 20 or 21 lowers the incidence of traffic crashes among young alcohol-impaired drivers. Whether the injury-pre\,ention benefits of a higher Iegal age are xvorth more than the perceived benefits of easy access to alcohol for youth is a value judgment. Recent events suggest that health professionals, policy-makers, and the public clearly believe the benefits outweigh the perceived costs of a legal drinking age of 21. Finall!., and perhaps most importantly, the legal age for drinking should not be viexved as an isolated policy. Rather, it is one example of an approach to the pretention of alcohol-related problems that focuses on restricting the availability and distribution of alcoholic beverages. An increase in the legal drinking age makes it more difficult for l'oung people to acquire and use alcoholic beverages; that is, it reduces alcohol ai.ailability. Xlany states have experimented xvith various levels of alcohol availability as reflected by changes in the legal age -21 for many lrears, 18 for several years. then back to 21 (or some intermediate age). These changes in availability of alcohol to youth have significantly affected the extent of at least one major alcohol-related health problem -automobile crash-related injuries. Public policies on other dimensions of alcohol availability not limited to one specific age group (e.g., retail price of alcohol; design, location, number, and density of alcohol outlets; and selling, serving, and marketing practices) should be examined for their utility in the prevention of alcohol-related health and social problems. A combination of numerous regulatorv, policy, and programmatic efforts is req&ed to achieve the ultimate goal of a society in xvhich the operation of a motor vehicle after the consumption of alcoholic beverages is taboo.
